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In this article I examine the articulation between contexts of agency within two kinds of discur-
sive projects involving Dalit identity and caste relations in Nepal, so as to illuminate competing 
and complimentary forms of self and group identity that emerge from demarcating social perim-
eters with political and economic consequences. The first involves a provocative border created 
around groups of people called Dalit by activists negotiating the symbols of identity politics in 
the country’s post-revolution democracy. Here subjective agency is expressed as political identity 
with attendant desires for social equality and power-sharing. The second context of Dalit agency 
emerges between people and groups as they engage in inter caste economic exchanges called riti 
maagnay in mixed caste communities that subsist on interdependent farming and artisan activi-
ties. Here caste distinctions are evoked through performed communicative agency that both resists 
domination and affirms status difference. Through this examination we find the rural terrain that is 
home to landless and poor rural Dalits only partially mirrors that evoked by Dalit activists as they 
struggle to craft modern identities. The sources of data analyzed include ethnographic field research 
conducted during various periods from 1988-2005, and discussions that transpired through-
out 2007 among Dalit activist members of an internet discussion group called nepaldalitinfo.
wAiting
  In the last week of November in 2006, forty-one 
years after the United Nation’s General Assembly 
adopted for ratification the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD 1965), thirty-five years after 
His Majesty’s Government of Nepal ratified it, six 
years after the National Human Rights Commission 
was established by mandate of the 1997 Nepal 
Human Rights Commission Act, four years after the 
Nepali government established the National Dalit 
Commission, and one week after the landmark 
peace agreement between home-grown Maoist rebels 
and the Nepali government, a Dalit woman sat alone 
on the familiar steps outside a Thakuri home in far 
western Bajhang district of Nepal.1 Through the 
clear night air Durga could hear from the third floor 
kitchen above her the slapping sound of fresh wheat 
dough and the clinking of heavy silver bracelets, as 
the Thakuri family’s eldest daughter-in-law prepared 
the evening meal of roti and vegetable curry. It was 
a cold evening, and a late autumn wind blew down 
from Khaptad Lekh. The figure on the steps hugged 
her bony legs closer to her chest and tightened the 
threadbare shawl around her thin frame. Her meal 
that evening would not begin until she returned 
home with the salt and spices she was now awaiting 
from the landlady. “Ama” I called to her. “Aren’t 
you cold? Why is she taking so long?”  As she had 
for so many years, through four children and nine 
grandchildren, the now elderly widow beseeched 
her Thakuri patrons inside the house to “have pity 
on me, I have so little at home to eat and I want 
to cook my potatoes with some salt and turmeric. 
Please give me only a small handful of salt and a 
piece of turmeric root.” Decades of sewing clothing 
and repairing shawls for the landowning family, first 
alongside her husband and then with the elder two 
of her three sons, had earned her the right – she 
hardly considered it a privilege – to ask the wealthy 
Thakuri landowners for help in times of need such 
as she experienced this night. But the obligatory 
waiting that was the customary sign of subservience 
for so-called lower castes seemed only to get longer, 
in spite of government proclamations that caste 
discrimination must end and that those who violated 
Dalit rights would be brought to justice. In spite 
of national laws, Durga herself witnessed recent 
incidents when Dalit students were barred from the 
local high school activities involving the worship of 
Saraswati, the goddess of learning. Durga wondered 
how those people - the young and defiant Maoist 
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followers with their bright red scarves and flapping banners 
who until recently had assembled in the once-active school 
yard near her Dalit community - were ever going to help her. 
She could not dream of seeing changes so great in her lifetime 
that she would be free from being a lower status person, a juto 
manche (impure person), a nachhune manche(not touchable 
person).
  Two months later in the new year of 2007, in the capital city 
of Kathmandu and in small and large cities around the world, 
a related discussion was underway, a debate among Dalits 
about who they are, what they should be called, and whether 
to relinquish or to retain those symbols attached to their Dalit 
status. Durga, of course, did not participate, and indeed, was 
only partially a subject of their discussions, focusing as they 
did primarily on men’s concerns. Yet she lived in the kind 
of place the discussants often evoked when referring to the 
persistence of caste discrimination in Nepal, namely, the 
rural farming communities to which urban Nepalis often 
point as reservoirs of conservative, non literate and backward 
conditions. I will suggest in this article that activists’ struggle 
over Dalit identity politics in Nepal’s new democracy might 
be challenged to include other agencies of resistance found in 
the lived experiences of rural Dalits like Durga, specifically 
in the context of economic transactions that daily frame 
their lives. My point is not to refute the legitimacy of Dalit 
activists’ claims as they craft modern political identities. 
Rather, I wish to show how these claims only partially mirror 
the complexities of rural Dalits’ agency of resistance within 
a socioeconomic context that must be considered in finding 
paths to social justice in the new Nepal.
loCAting borderS
  In this article I use an analytic trope of boundary to draw 
out the relationship between two kinds of discursive domains 
involving Dalit identity and caste relations in Nepal, so as 
to illuminate potentially complimentary forms of agency that 
emerge from demarcating social perimeters with political 
consequences. Although the social worlds discussed are 
in reality more fluid than is suggested by the heuristic tool 
of framing and bounding, the political activists engaged 
in social transformation and the rural farmers engaged in 
trade strategically channel semi-fixed social distinctions 
into culturally relevant categories offered by the participants 
themselves, only to then contest them. Thus framing is both a 
tool of constructing and of dismantling, by Dalits and by the 
anthropologist. 
  The first is a provocative border created around groups of 
people called Dalit by activists dynamically negotiating the 
symbols of identity politics in the country’s post-revolution 
democracy. Here subjective agency is expressed as political 
identity with attendant desires for social change and for power. 
The second framing, also a fluid social one, emerges between 
people (like Durga) and groups as they engage in inter caste 
exchanges called riti magné in mixed caste communities that 
subsist on interdependent farming and artisan activities. Here 
caste distinctions are evoked through communicative agency 
that both resists domination and affirms status difference. 
  Recent debates among Dalit activists focus on the merits of 
assigning the label “Dalit” to a heterogeneous group of people 
that shares a history of being discriminated against socially, 
politically, economically, and religiously by those who are 
unlike them in social status. The discussions I will draw 
from took place primarily among Dalit members of a Yahoo 
internet group called nepaldalitinfo that is, according to its 
description, “run by a group of Dalit intellectuals and friends 
of Dalits of Nepal” (http://www.nepaldalitinfo.net). Non 
Dalits are also members of the discussion group, but they did 
not significantly participate in this particular discussion. All 
those quoted in this article are Nepali Dalit activists in the 
caste reform movement either inside or outside of Nepal, and 
have asked that their real names be used.
  It is not surprising that consensus on the merits of 
strategically promoting the term Dalit would be difficult for 
the community to reach, for there is variation in the lives 
of so-called untouchables. Dalits, who comprise anywhere 
from 12- 25% of Nepal’s population, are geographically 
spread throughout the country with a large majority living 
in rural communities.2 Their diverse artisan skills on which 
the agrarian economy depends have separate and unique 
histories, with differing potentiality in the contemporary 
world; for example, village demand for  handmade leather 
shoes  made by Sarkis has dropped precipitously with the 
availability of mass-produced footwear from China, Nepal 
and India, while artisan products made by basket weavers 
(storage granaries) and ironsmiths (agricultural tools) have 
not yet been replaced by market products. Dalits themselves 
engage in relative degrees of ranking based on ritual purity 
(Cameron 1998; Parish 1996), a small minority has become 
highly educated in national and foreign institutions, and 
there is uneven sharing of knowledge about what other 
Dalits are experiencing, particularly for people living in rural 
areas.3  Finally, and for our purposes here, those involved in 
the debate over political identity agree on who the oppressors 
are, but they disagree on what the basis of that oppression is 
(Religious? Political? Economic?). Therefore they find it difficult 
to agree on the means by which to eliminate the conditions 
of oppression, particularly in relation to powerful symbols 
like Dalit, as this case shows. Using the label “Dalit” keeps 
alive the meanings associated with caste discrimination, and 
is politically efficient, but it is nonetheless a denotation that 
is unacceptable for some activists. They seek an alternative 
language that more accurately reflects who “Dalits” in fact 
are.
  The second set of boundaries I examine involves the social 
perimeter of mutual obligations negotiated around and 
between people as they initiate and engage in inter caste 
exchanges called riti magné in rural mixed caste communities 
that subsist on interdependent farming and artisan activities. 
Using ethnographic data culled from field research in Bajhang 
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over the past nearly twenty years, I will discuss forms of power 
that Dalits have developed in their interactions with Brahman-
Chhetris. Here the demarcations are less predetermined 
than they are the contingent outcome of morally-informed 
human interaction that is strategic, informative, intimate, 
deceptive, degrading, empowering, and enduring -- in other 
words, complexly communicative. In examining riti magné 
interactions and exchanges, we find the rural terrain that 
is home to landless and poor Dalits only partially mirrors 
the rural sites evoked by Dalit activists as they struggle to 
craft modern identities. Instead, an “ethnography of the 
particular” (Abu-Lughod 1991) that I present here finds that 
mixed caste relations are more complex than is suggested 
by the dichotomy of a modern, caste-free urban site versus a 
caste-dominated rural one. The modern world may impinge 
poignantly on urban people and result in new struggles for 
negotiating and framing the moral self in Nepal (Liechty 
2002; McHugh 2004). However, negotiating the moral terms 
of Dalit political identity in post-revolutionary Nepal involves 
a different set of inclusive values that seeks liberation for all 
Dalits and that therefore should include forms of rural agency. 
The challenge for activists is how to incorporate what Lauren 
Leve (2007) has identified for Nepali rural women activists 
as ‘mutual obligations’ that help to define the self, and in 
the case of Dalits, I suggest, that encompass obligations and 
expectations that serve as anchors of agency and sites of 
political transformation. 
the Future in ContemporAry nepAl
  Events of late in Nepal suggest that there is no period like 
the present when Dalits, who have been dehumanized by 
the words in religious books, who are oppressed by people 
in their communities, and who remain virtually unprotected 
against discrimination by the state’s ineffective criminal 
justice system, might imagine a better world than the one 
they have known for perhaps centuries. The current period 
is one of hope and potential. As lawmakers in Kathmandu 
for the past year have calculated community representational 
proportions, group prerogatives, legislative seats for urban and 
“backward” regions, and the proportion of representation by 
Dalit and janajatí leaders, the exchange of ideas has become 
invigorating. Turning to one arena of such exchanges, this essay 
considers how closely the now globally circulating discourse 
on Dalit identity in the new democracy fits with the lived 
experience of Dalits in rural agrarian Nepal, particularly their 
economic dependence on non Dalits of higher caste status. In 
crafting modern identities, the slippage between these two 
sites – the reified world of global discourse among activists 
and educated elites, and the everyday life of subsistence 
farmers – results, I suggest, from the modern requisite that 
identity be bounded, exclusive and stable in a form unfamiliar 
to the culture of Nepal. Moreover, Dalit political identity 
must arise from a moral ground that includes all Dalits, 
rural and urban, and this is difficult to achieve within the 
environment of powerful ideologies such as modernity and 
development that are widely circulating in the country, that 
influence activists’ agendas, and that tend to devalue rural 
life as somehow removed from progress. As we will see, Dalit 
activists struggle over what their identity is, at this time and 
place in Nepal’s history, when new directions are being forged 
that finally address centuries of social injustice. Dalit struggle 
is not, however, a new phenomena; what I hope to show is 
how oppressed castes in rural communities, too, have evolved 
moral calculations and communicative strategies that allow 
them to challenge domination and cultivate self-respect in 
culturally acceptable ways. What should be acknowledged, 
therefore, is how the modern struggle for a casteless society 
that is the Dalit political agenda circulating in one internet 
debate, finds a well-used adaptive strategy of resistance to 
domination that nonetheless remains a ‘hidden transcript’ 
(Scott, 1990).
  Rural village inter caste exchanges I consider are typically 
initiated by Dalits who request material goods from 
Brahman-Chhetri providers. Such requests are a common 
form of patterned interaction between people whose families 
and lineages have been connected for several generations. 
The practice locally is called riti magné, which translates as 
asking, begging, requesting, or soliciting from a landowning 
and so-called high-caste person according to “tradition” 
(riti).4 With little exception, the solicitor is poor (landless or 
nearly so) and visits the wealthier landholding family’s home 
– to whom the term riti is extended as a name - to request 
food necessities such as rice, wheat, and corn, spices such as 
chili, turmeric and salt, nonessential goods such as cigarettes, 
tobacco, tea leaves, and sugar, or a cash loan. What I find is 
that such inter caste transactions suggest manifold cultural 
ideas at work in cultivating the needs and desires of givers and 
receivers. What transpires in riti magné is a communicative 
strategy with contours similar to those described by James 
Scott on maneuvers of resistance by lower status persons 
to gain advantage in achieving a goal while preserving self 
dignity (Scott 1985; 1990). Thus, defining Dalit as either 
an essential set of characteristics or as a condition involving 
an on-going process of discrimination, as we will find 
happens in negotiating modern Dalit political identity, both 
fall short of acknowledging forms of  Dalit resistance such 
as demonstrating equal to superior moral understanding of 
community obligations, thus justifying forms of shaming and 
work delays, all of which challenge caste stratification and 
weaken the hierarchical structure in rural communities. 
ConteSting “dAlit”
  The anti-monarchy Maoist insurgency in Nepal created a 
coalition of groups around an ideology that promised, through 
armed revolution, to deliver social justice by eliminating the 
power of internal (mainly royalists and Brahman-Chhetri) and 
external (mainly Indian) “imperialists.” The role Dalits have 
played in the Maoist insurgency is unclear, but there is an 
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unverified assumption that because the movement espouses 
eliminating caste and other forms of discrimination, Dalits 
comprised many of the cadres. Bajhangi friends tell me that 
Dalits are involved in the Maoist movement there, but not 
in sizable numbers and that in fact Thakuri and other elite 
castes represent the majority of Maoists. 
  I turn here to the discourse of Dalit identity politics as the 
activists attempt to craft their relationship to symbols and as 
those symbols are debated, negotiated, and contested by an 
internet community called nepaldalitinfo. The list was founded 
by Dr. Drona Rasali four years ago and has approximately 
330 members, mostly educated Nepali women and men from 
predominantly Dalit groups, though not exclusively (there 
are several non Nepalis as well as non Dalits who are active 
members). Though the debate over the use of the term Dalit is 
not new to nepaldalitinfo and to NGOs working to eradicate 
caste discrimination in Nepal (some discussants on both 
sides say they have debated this term “over a hundred times”), 
the discussion over the past year was stirred by the hard-
fought and real possibility that the term “Dalit” would appear 
in Nepal’s new Constitution. Indeed, the interim and yet to be 
ratified Constitution mentions Dalits in item 6 of Part 3 under 
“Fundamental Rights and Duties”:
vi. All types of exploitation-oppression including untouchabil-
ity of the Dalits shall end, and special rights shall be ensured for 
the Dalits in all sectors.
And Part 11, item 3 under the “Constituent Assembly” states:
3. Women, oppressed nationalities, Dalits, the disabled etc. 
shall be included in the Constituent Assembly in proportion to 
their population. (Interim Constitution of Federal Democratic 
Republic of Nepal, 2063)
  As the internet discussion deepened, several key 
understandings of Dalit members about their community’s 
history emerged. Some discussants argued that the global 
circulation of the term Dalit and its political acceptance in 
South Asia are particularly powerful reasons to retain its use. 
It should be noted that however globally recognized the term 
Dalit may now be, it is relatively new to Nepal, having achieved 
wide circulation only in the past decade, even though it was 
first introduced to Nepal by India’s most famous untouchable, 
Dr. B.R. (Babasaheb) Ambedkar, one of the chief architects 
of the Constitution of India (Zelliot 1992) and founder of 
the Republican Party of India (later to become the Bahujan 
Samaj Party), when he visited Nepal in early 1956. A decade 
later in 1967 it was used in the name of the first organization 
in Nepal to address Dalit issues, Rastriya Nepal Dalit Jana 
Vikash Parishad. Still, the term Dalit is unfamiliar to people in 
many rural communities in Nepal, though as communication 
about caste issues spreads through the country people are 
being introduced not only to the word but to its meaning and 
connotations.  I met numerous members of so-called lower 
castes in Bajhang and Dailekh who even in the year 2000 
were unfamiliar with the term Dalit. Nonetheless, use of the 
term Dalit to refer to a group of people with a stigmatized 
social status is common among many social welfare and 
government organizations, for the label facilitates efficient 
political organizing and certain actions to be taken on Dalits’ 
behalf, including numerous social justice programs. Indeed, 
one list member was concerned that donor agencies would 
cease contributing to their cause if there was no identifying 
and unifying symbol associated with the oppressed group. 
And without doubt the recent historical appointment of two 
Dalit leaders from the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and 
the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist) to 
the 13-member Council of Ministers is evidence of a national 
leadership consensus on the special circumstances of Dalits 
and the need for their group to be more integrated into the 
political structure. The latter decision by Prime Minister Girija 
Prasad Koirala was met with enormous enthusiasm and relief 
by the members of nepaldalitinfo, and demonstrated to them 
the political power of unity under one symbol. These should 
be seen as welcome signs of albeit cautious progress, for the 
process of Dalit representation on the Constituent Assembly, 
in sharp contrast to the ministerial appointments, is currently 
drawing criticism on nepaldalitinfo, as is discussed briefly 
later.
  Advocates for retaining the label Dalit argue several points. 
First, the term is regarded as a symbol of pride of heritage 
rather than of scorn (or at least should be adopted in that 
spirit), which efficiently unifies under one label different 
groups of people with similar histories of oppression. The 
legacy it captures is vividly rendered in the literal meaning 
of Dalit, to be broken or downtrodden. Use of the word Dalit 
as part of one’s identity is a bold statement of the unique 
oppression groups of people have experienced (and in fact 
four Newar jaat have, through a spokesperson, publicly 
rejected the application of the term to them), thus making 
their identity unlike other minorities in Nepal. And finally, 
the term Dalit is beginning to be nationally and globally 
recognized. Although not all advocates agree with all these 
points, they all fully support the inclusion of the term Dalit 
in the Interim Constitution as they consider their group to 
be unlike other minorities such as janajatí.5 In defense of the 
term, one long-term Dalit activist provides a history of the 
adoption of the term in Nepal.
In this regard we have had so many discussions with Indian 
Dalit intellectuals and leaders including Babu Jagjivan Ram. 
From all these discussions what we came to know is that the 
word Dalit is the only word which can address in one word to 
all the victims of caste discrimination for centuries. Some of 
our intellectuals have said it has been imported from India. It is 
right, many things are imported from India including foods and 
culture, because we are an open border. Truly when Dr. Baba 
Saheb Ambedkar came in Nepal on 1956 and had important 
discussions with the Dalit leaders of Nepal, since then the word 
Dalit was used to address this community.
- Om Prakash VK Gahatraj (aka Om Prakash VK), February 
23, 2007
17
  National and international non government organizations 
(INGOs and NGOs) in Nepal, of which there are perhaps 
thousands, have been relatively slow in identifying Dalits as a 
group that should be assisted in reversing the many negative 
effects of centuries of discrimination. The history and politics 
of this significant oversight, while a worthy topic of research 
and analysis, is not addressed here. However, following the 
restoration of democracy in 1990, many such organizations 
have been founded, so many in fact that at least two 
federations of Dalit NGOs (DNGOs) have been formed to aid in 
organizing, communicating, fund raising, and facilitating the 
development of projects among the various NGOs addressing 
Dalit issues. Leaders of these two federations estimate there to 
be between 700-1000 registered Dalit NGOs in the country of 
Nepal, as well as one government Commission (established in 
2002).6 In addition to these are a hundred more NGOs that, 
while not specifically mentioning Dalits as their mission, 
nonetheless develop on an ad hoc basis projects and programs 
specifically targeting Dalit communities. The international 
donor agencies that financially support the work of DNGOs 
include Danida/HUGOU (Denmark), DFID/ESP (England), 
USAID, SNV (Netherlands), Norad (Norway), CCO Canada 
(Canadian Embassy), Finnish Government, GTZ (Germany) 
and UNDP.   The role of international aid is identified by some 
activist discussants as an important consideration in crafting 
a politically relevant identity. In response to those who feel it 
is important to pay attention to what might appeal to donor 
organizations, Mr. Om Prakash VK, Chairman of the Centre 
for Dalit and Rural Development in Kathmandu, offers a 
different perspective. He strongly urges that Dalits not feel 
dependent on donors for social change, and to understand 
that the term Dalit will not be in place forever. Mr. Om 
Prakash VK, though, does argue for using the term Dalit and 
to seeing its value particularly in the present time:
We are not thinking donors will support here for [a] long time. 
They are not our main components. They are very, very tempo-
rary. It is [the] nation whom we are targeting and dealing with 
permanently. The nation has cheated us for hundreds of years. 
It has to give us compensation to overcome the condition of 
Dalit. Dalit word is not a caste, it is a condition …we are facing 
due to caste discrimination for hundreds of years. The word mi-
nority can not address this community. In one side we are not in 
minority in comparison to other groups of castes, in other side 
there are other minority groups in non Dalits who have also 
good access in national resources. Again I want to inform to our 
intellectuals that we have no hobby to write the word Dalit for-
ever. We have no personal interest in this word. But this word 
has now taken a strong position inside and outside especially 
through communication which is helping us to make our path 
easier for struggle for human rights. If the condition Dalit is no 
more we will no more write Dalit. Presently a bright signal is 
seen after People’s Movement-II to overcome this problem, so 
please do not disturb to this line of possible achievement in this 
crucial time, because hundreds of Dalit leaders have worked for 
decades in Dalit movement. It is now time we are expecting to 
get remarkable result for the sake of Dalits.
- Om Prakash VK, February 23, 2007
Retaining the word Dalit thus points to the condition of 
discrimination, and does not signify one’s family identity or 
one’s subjectivity. Rather it is a corrupt social condition that 
the term in fact points to, not to a shameful state of selfhood. 
As the discussion proceeds, participants list many causes and 
sources of the condition of discrimination. Several key factors 
of discrimination are enumerated by Ramu Bishwokarma, a 
doctoral student in sociology at the University of Maryland, 
College Park:
The underpinning causes, as it appears to me are -- lack of edu-
cation, lack of income, lack of good health, lack of political and 
social empowerment, just to name few. Until and unless we are 
completely able to treat these causes, the disease of castiesm 
which have named as “Dalit” will still be there in our society, 
no matter whether we like it or not.
- Ramu Bishwokarma, February 23, 2007
  Opponents of using the term Dalit, while not disagreeing 
with the shared history of oppression or with the results of 
united political activism, believe that the term is a shameful 
one that perpetuates and reinforces the boundaries of 
exclusion, rather than ultimately eradicating them. For them, 
the term Dalit is a modern political version of a centuries-old 
practice in which boundaries have become ever more rigid. 
The impurity associated with a learned artisan skill came 
to be more concretely denoted in the allegedly forced use of 
occupation as the last name for groups who were primarily 
artisans and small owner cultivators, thus obscuring birth 
names associated with one’s clan and lineage to the point 
where they are often unknown to women, and recalled by 
men for marriage matchmaking purposes only. Two on-line 
discussants express strong objections to the use of the term 
Dalit, due to its association with a history of oppression and 
to how that oppression was shaped from the very religion 
they and others practice 
When someone calls DALIT [emphasis in original], I feel hu-
miliated no matter how qualified I am.  This humiliation will 
be there for forever for our generations to come if we do not 
eliminate this word now.  A doctor, an engineer, a scientist, a 
teacher, no matter who we are, we are tagged as DALIT. I think 
everyone, from their heart, should now think at this time not 
to make any mistakes at this critical time which will make our 
generation shameful forever.  
- Prakash Nepal, May 9, 2006
I do dislike the term “Dalit.” It comes across like a gali [insult] to 
me. No one is born Dalit. We are made to be Dalit by so-called 
upper class and they did so by using the very religion we prac-
tice. They cheated us. We have a responsibility to educate our 
people, [the] upper-class, and the world that they oppressed us 
by using the religion we practice. In my opinion, by describing 
yourself “Dalit” you are propagating the belief the other side 
forced upon us and accepting your position in the society.
- Dr. Ramesh Sunar, February 21, 2007  
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Dr. Sunar goes on to point out that international recognition 
of the term Dalit does not necessarily justify its use, and like 
others on the list, he notes that the word harijan, adopted 
by Gandhi to refer to India’s untouchables, today has 
produced little positive outcome for the lower castes in India 
(a disputable observation for some; what is not disputable, 
though, is that Indian Dalits dislike the term harijan, which 
translates as “children of god” and which for many implies 
a bastard birth). The long term goal of equality for future 
generations is only possible by eliminating the word, as stated 
by one discussant who points out the problem of creating a 
false and misleading dichotomy:
Dalit title/word is contradictory to our goal to create an equal, 
free, honored and dignified society. Because it will divide the 
society into two groups forever – non-Dalits and Dalits, which 
is not our vision.
- Krishna Sob, March 1, 2007
  As the symbol disappears, so goes the stigma. And the 
symbol will disappear only by abandoning its use and 
embarking on a unified effort to fight for one’s rights, and 
not by fighting to establish a false dignity around the term 
Dalit, or any other terms such as oppressed, untouchable, or 
harijan. Thus, a modern idea of rights must replace an ancient 
idea of stratified jat. Dr. Sunar suggests alternative names for 
the political action group, such as Samanta Sena or Samaj 
Sena, as he says “some other name that you find appropriate 
for our struggle that has no association with intolerable words 
[like Dalit] that are mentioned above.” (Dr. Ramesh Sunar, 
February 22, 2007)
  In one very interesting post, the suggestion is made that 
stigmatized occupational names – called “dead bodies” -  be 
replaced by thar (clan) names that denote important kinship 
meanings with no stigma. 
We are fighting a long cultural and social war. It’s not easy to 
get rid of everything right now. If we keep improving in the 
way we are thinking (out of the box), things will improve, 
too. For example, all of us still remember that [the surname] 
Bishwakarma was not there thirty years ago. Once Hira Lal 
Bishwakarma became Minister, everyone from that community 
started writing Bishwakarma. … Eventually, we are all human 
beings and we should have the freedom to write what we want. 
There is no harm in writing different names.  Why should we 
stick to «Sunar» or «Pariyar» or «Bishwakarma» which are not 
even our Thars? We have our own Thars. We should have a free 
mentality to write as our last name, for example, Baral, Paudyal, 
Gautam, and so on. 
- Prakash Nepal February 22, 2007
  Thar or clan names may be similar to or the same as 
Brahman-Chhetri thar names, groups that in fact sometimes 
use them as surnames. The extent to which Dalits in the past 
used thar names is unknown, though the forced replacement 
of thar names with occupational names in the past may 
be assumed to result from their uncomfortable identity to 
Brahman-Chhetri thar names. Still others have adopted the 
non stigmatized surnames Nepal, Nepali, and Biswakarma 
(alternatively Bishwakarma or Bishwokarma, translated 
as “workers and skilled artisans” and the “God of workers 
and skilled artisans”)7, and some nepaldalitinfo discussants 
strongly advocate using these surnames.
  Intended to symbolize a history of discrimination, the term 
Dalit conjures for many an essentialized identity in opposition 
to a dominant other, elite caste groups. Those who support 
retaining the term Dalit advocate for this distinction as it 
reflects an historical reality. However, added to the dangers 
already noted by its dissenters is the term’s monolithic and 
homogenizing tendency. As Abu-Lughod (1991) discusses 
about the culture concept’s hierarchical tendencies, the term 
Dalit likewise may obscure other forms of difference within 
the social environment (such as gender and class), and may 
overlook the connections between individuals and groups 
on either side of the divide (such as values of amity and 
cooperation, as will be discussed below). The discourse and 
practice of economic transactions between different caste 
groups to which we now turn illustrates well the complex 
relations between people of different castes. Dalits have 
evolved forms of resistance suitable to social circumstances 
that draw on values other than rank, including community-
based mutual obligations
riti mAgné: interdependenCe, rAnk 
And dAlit reSiStAnCe in A SubSiStenCe 
AgrAriAn eConomy
  The interactive dynamics of riti maagnay results in part from 
social ranking in Bajhang that allocates differential status 
to people based on gender, age, and caste, and that expects 
the fulfillment of responsibilities and behaviors that follow 
therewith. This ranking practice was recently admonished 
by the founder of nepaldalitinfo, Dr. Drona Rasali, when he 
identified the significance to Dalits of a customary Nepali 
practice that permits and even encourages inquiry of one’s 
social position in a variety of ways, finding in the practice the 
roots of domination: 
We must revolt … against those people in Nepal who at the first 
instance of meeting will not initiate conversation without ask-
ing anything other than “Kasma?” “Ke Thar?” “Ke Ma?” [literally 
Which? What clan? On what? These are general questions that 
ask for a reply about one’s status situation]. One tends to ask 
the other person “Kasma?” with the corrupted mind to explore 
if he could somehow dominate the person he is meeting for 
the first time. This happens even among Baahuns, or Chhetris. 
This mindset is imbedded deep in every Nepali. Because he is 
brought up that way. He or she is brought up to see ‘high’ and 
‘low’ in every thing around him or her. We all know but may 
not realize how serious is the Nepali problem of finding ‘low’ 
in others. 
- Dr. Drona Rasali, May 15, 2007
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Dr. Rasali links the behavior of determining rank to the 
desire to dominate, rather than as an expression of the need 
for respect from others. While neither an essential quality of 
being Nepali or Hindu, nor a totalizing social phenomenon 
(ala Dumont; see Appadurai 1988), Dr. Rasali nonetheless 
observes a practice that contributes to social injustice and 
lost opportunities, effecting large numbers of people. The 
result is layers of power and purity abounding in Nepali 
human and deific life, compelling people to try to know the 
relative value of individuals, families, and gods. Following 
Dr. Rasali’s point of how inequality is maintained in Nepali 
society, the riti maagnay interactions described here are a 
common economically-based arena in which Dalit agency 
expands the discourse of social value beyond simple caste 
distinctions of high and low, to include community-based 
moral responsibility, respect for the appropriate timing of 
actions, and ethical generosity.
  Landless Dalit artisan families in Bajhang are connected to 
landowning Brahman-Chhetri families through economic 
interdependence in which artisans provide products and 
labor to landowners. Brahman-Chhetri lineages over the 
generations have amassed wealth in land through historical 
processes that have excluded Dalits, a process intensified in 
the modern period with the human and natural erosion of 
arable land (Cameron 1998). Today Dalits exchange their 
artisan products and services with owner cultivators who 
regularly provide harvest shares and are expected to meet 
many other material and consumption needs of their Dalit 
dependents. Harvest payments from landholding families 
to landless Dalit families serve as the economic and moral 
backbone of the inter caste relationship as these flow from 
the established right of each family to ask for services, food, 
or cash loans from the other in time of need.8 
  In this section I focus on two kinds of non-ritual requests: the 
semiannual solicitation of khalo (harvest shares), and everyday 
requests described in the opening paragraphs. What is evident 
is that both ranking and reciprocity are present throughout 
the interaction; riti magné is not a pure form of power and 
subservience, nor is it solely a conventional reciprocal 
exchange between status equals common to agricultural 
economies elsewhere. Certainly it is the case that riti magné 
is partially structured by codes of caste-based conduct; but in 
practice, magné is an encounter in which the community values 
of mutual reciprocity, friendship, cooperation, and dharma 
(religion, religious duty) are strategically and persuasively 
manipulated by both parties in achieving their respective 
goals. In such seasonal and everyday requests, the complex 
social boundaries separating Dalits and Brahman-Chhetris 
are infused with potential for future exchange and with 
ambiguity as to relative status. Although economic inequality 
brings the two parties together in mutual interdependence, 
it is the Dalit’s cultural adroitness at engaging an ethos of 
cooperation that intermittently undermines a caste-based 
hierarchy of difference.9 Thus, riti magné transactions expose 
the special relational dilemmas encountered by Dalits in rural 
settings. 
  In the kinds of everyday and seasonal interactions that are the 
focus here, Dalits deploy strategies that resist the domination 
explicit in being excluded from temples, water taps, and the 
interior of elite castes’ homes. Brahman-Chhetri, on the other 
hand, seek to retain their position of dominance during the 
transactions by forcing subservient behavior from Dalits, 
making them wait for long periods for the requested items, 
criticizing their behavior, and insisting on labor in return. 
Riti magné incorporates the commonly-held beliefs about caste 
differences that include relative service to others (Dalits give 
more), relative wealth (Dalits have less), and relative social 
status. 
  Of the many scholars writing on caste in India, Gloria 
Raheja’s work takes the practice of inter caste material 
transactions most seriously (Raheja 1990). Her work, while 
exhaustive and scholarly, contains two omissions that I have 
addressed more fully elsewhere (Cameron 1998). Briefly, 
she analyzes the ideology of upper-caste Gujar landowners 
thoroughly but neglects to discuss and analyze lower caste 
beliefs about what transpires in a transaction, in spite of the 
fact that lower castes dyadically figure into her models of 
centrality and mutuality. Nor does her analysis address non-
ritual transactions, focusing instead on transactions between 
Gujars and others in ritual contexts alone. In one of her final 
chapters of The Poison in the Gift Raheja develops a model of 
mutuality based on data from harvest payments, wherein 
a kind of fictive kinship relationship supports the ethos of 
mutual transactional relations. However, this fictive kinship 
is never confirmed by Dalits, about whom we might wonder 
if they accept fictive family ties with status unequals. In 
Bajhang, similar transactions do not create a model of fictive 
kinship. Rather, the ethos supporting agricultural and artisan 
interdependence, as described below, includes inherited rights 
and responsibilities to non kin families, religious values of 
meritorious behavior, and community values of cooperation 
and generosity.
  Drawing from the insights of Pierre Bourdieu on practice 
theory, customary material exchanges between castes—and 
in particular the language by which they transpire—are 
analyzed here as speech acts in which Nepali artisans and 
farmers actively deploy cultural models, normative rules, 
social disposition, and linguistic strategies, to build a ‘sense 
of the exchange game’ between status unequals (1977; 
1990). The patterned regularity of word, gesture, voice, and 
outcome indicate shared cultural models, while the dynamic, 
constitutive quality of the exchanges points us past structure 
to the strategic, agentive subjectivity of creative linguistic 
performance. Thus, when we look perfunctorily at riti magné 
encounters, we find that domination is explicit, and results 
from Dalit economic deprivation and community Hindu 
beliefs about the relative purity of persons. If we look closer 
at the cultural context of magné, however, we find that Dalits 
resist domination by those of upper caste.10 Social boundaries 
are erected and contested on a daily basis, the meanings of 
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which are “co-constructed by participants, emergent from 
particular social interactions” (Ahearn 2001, 111). The 
dialogic and performative dynamics of the magné context are 
strategically manipulated and controlled by its interlocutors 
- the landowner and the landless, the non Dalit and the 
Dalit – ultimately to achieve pragmatic outcomes that meet 
subsistence needs for the one and guarantee a labor source 
and the merit of giving for the other. 
  Khare describes the refutation of domination as «subtle, 
discrete, and even partially masked by subservience» 
(1984), a theme taken up by James Scott in his well-
known comparative studies of discourses and techniques 
of resistance to social domination (1985; 1990). Dalits of 
eastern Nepal are described by Folmar as often following a 
path of masking their identity in what he calls the “politics 
of anonymity” where the identity of Dalit is what is hidden 
for fear of injury or insult, and replaced with a different clan 
name or a different jaat altogether (Folmar this issue, p. 17). 
Folmar and I are both describing what to Scott and Khare are 
refutations of domination that are enacted in forms «suitable 
to social circumstances», suitable because they are created 
from a shared cultural model yet performed in such a way 
that may go unacknowledged by those in power. 
  The Dalits I have spoken with in Bajhang, Dailekh, 
and Kathmandu Valley about their experiences of being 
subordinated explain that while they abhor the treatment 
they receive, nonetheless they feel they can assert (albeit 
temporary) power to regulate their relations with elite castes, 
in traditional contexts such as riti maagnay, in modern 
development projects, and in the rare but increasingly 
acceptable professional contexts of inter caste interactions 
(Cameron 2008, forthcoming; Cameron and Rai 2000). 
What Dalits control in the riti maagnay relationship is in 
the broadest sense the relationship itself, as it sustains 
a particularly poignant appearance of necessity born of 
economic interdependence – Dalits as laborers for Brahman-
Chhetri. 
  What distinguishes riti magné from other types of social 
interaction in Bajhang? First, it is not simply gaf, informal 
and spontaneous conversation or gossip. Instead, riti magné 
is one part of the agricultural cycle in Bajhang in which most 
community members participate as receivers and givers of 
products produced locally and used for subsistence. It is 
enacted on the stage of decades-long social and economic 
relationships, and keeps in motion on-going expectations 
of labor and material exchange rooted in a non capitalist 
economy. An economic transaction at its base, it is also a 
social arena of consequence to Dalit well-being in which 
social knowledge, artisan competence, and family productive 
reliability all factor into the negotiation of present boundaries 
and future expectations. Second, riti magné is not random, 
though it may appear so, as it is initiated by one party with 
little prior notice to the other. Indeed, riti magné is obligatory 
due to the economic dependency of landless Dalits on 
landholding Brahman-Chhetris. 
  Finally, riti magné involves communicative strategies 
deployed by Dalits to realize their goals while minimizing 
the subservient position high caste owner cultivators confer 
on them. These include selecting auspicious days to make 
requests; using gestures and symbols of subservience and 
dominance; engaging in mutually enjoyable conversation about 
family, crops, politics, and village events; mixing pleading 
and indignant tones; minimizing the amount requested; 
and shaming the riti if generosity is not forthcoming. These 
strategies convey shifting messages of denial, acceptance, 
resistance, compromise, friendship, and finally, satisfaction. 
dharma, karma and dukha
  Commonly translated simply as religion, the local meaning in 
Bajhang of dharma or dhamma is dutiful action that produces 
religious merit. Implicit in the concept of dharma as duty is 
the idea of relation, particularly in the form of duty to others. 
The specifics of one’s birth, such as gender and caste, are 
reflected in an individual’s understanding of their and others’ 
dharma. A common linguistic contraction is jatidharma, 
the “duty of one’s caste” or “the duty of one’s gender.” The 
concept of jatidharma presumes that individuals and groups 
have different duties and responsibilities, and fulfilling those 
responsibilities brings honor to oneself and the family. Thus, 
dharma is understood as “duty according to one’s social 
place.” It is important to note that jatidharma distinctions 
are not inherently stratifying or hierarchical; they only 
become so through people’s claims to power and authority 
through repetitious and everyday practices of dominance, 
subordination and resistance. During riti maagnay Dalits 
claim that it is a riti’s dharma to give them what they are 
asking for. Such moral expectations are further reinforced by 
Dalits’ descriptions of their poverty-driven suffering.
  The dukkha (suffering) of being Dalit in Bajhang is linked to 
the concept of dharma; there is inevitable suffering associated 
with certain positions and situations in life. Individuals 
experiencing social and economic hardship may feel it is 
the unfolding of their karma to be experiencing pain, and 
that the fate of being from a stigmatized social group vastly 
exacerbates that situation. Experiences of situational dukkha 
arising from one’s karma can be alleviated by looking to 
external sources to help alleviate the suffering, be it healers 
for illness, shamans for emotional distress, or landowning riti 
for economic need. The community strongly values listening 
to another person’s experiences of suffering; referencing one’s 
dukkha in the riti maagnay context expands the interaction 
between people to areas of emotional intensity involving 
compassion. When a bhagya confronts a reluctant riti he 
reminds her of the religious merit, dharma, gained through 
giving.11 The bhagya tries to appeal to the sympathy of the 
riti by describing his current situation of dukkha - a spouse is 
gone, a child is ill, an adult family member is unable to work, 
the cows are not giving milk, or there is insufficient money 
for a marriage. By expressing his dukkha, the Dalit artisan 
gives the riti an opportunity to make life temporarily easier 
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for him by giving generously. In turn, the riti reaps the merit 
and power from giving.
the right to work
  Fundamentally, the work that Dalits reliably perform for 
riti families supports their rightful claim to khalo and other 
things. The inter caste agreements between families entitle and 
obligate both sides to be the preferred employer and employee 
to each other. The moral obligation to work and to employ is 
quite strong in Bajhang, and has kept families in production 
relationships with one another over several generations. In 
the agricultural economy, landowning riti should ask for 
artisan products and labor first from their bhagya families. 
Indeed, landholding families are very reluctant to purchase 
tools, baskets, pottery and other artisan and farming services 
directly from a non-bhagya, much preferring to draw on the 
relationship they have with bhagya families, even if it may 
cost more in regular large and frequent small “payments.” The 
riti can rely on bhagya to deliver goods regularly and timely, 
and they can ask bhagya family members to work at any 
time. Third, from the riti’s perspective, an important social 
relationship is maintained that they believe ensures their 
continued economic, social, and political dominance. 
the right to receive: harvest Shares and everyday 
needs
  Community members believe it is the right of Dalits to 
request food and other necessities from Brahman-Chhetri 
ritis; doing so sustains them through lean periods and 
temporarily soothes the hardships of their poverty. As a 
group, the Dalits of Bajhang expect fair payment in exchange 
for services rendered, and they make it known widely if they 
suspect they have been cheated by their ritis. Dalit artisans and 
laborers will delay or refuse to complete important farming or 
other work until the payment matter is resolved, a situation 
they raise as an issue during riti maagnay discussions. They 
therefore characterize their relationship with landowning riti 
primarily as one of asymmetrical economic reciprocity, rather 
than in kinship terms, as Raheja (1990) has suggested. 
  The largest request made in the agricultural cycle is for 
khalo, the semi-annual harvest shares of rice and wheat that 
may also include other grains such as corn, millet, lentils 
and soybeans.12 Khalo is considered payment for work 
completed and a down-payment on relationship continuity. 
Khalo payments in Bajhang are mainly based on the value 
of the commodity produced or service rendered, though 
other considerations such as number of dependents, the 
sex of the laborers (men’s work is paid more than women’s 
work), imminent and costly weddings, and illness are also 
factored into khalo shares.13 A bhagya with many riti can 
amass substantially more khalo in a season than a bhagya 
with no riti. Indeed, the poorest Dalit households are those 
with few to no riti, and the relatively wealthier ones have 
many. The communal obligation to pay bhagya may produce 
a surplus from khalo for Dalit bhagya families with many 
workers, extensive riti networks, and highly valued products. 
Although khalo is considered a payment for services rendered, 
the bhagya must walk to the threshing floor or the riti’s house 
to obtain it. In addition to khalo shares, all Dalit families with 
riti bhagya ties request food and other material goods from 
their patrons throughout the year, as Durga is described as 
doing in the introduction.14  
ASking
  The strategies employed by Dalits to achieve their desired 
exchange goals  include selecting auspicious days and times 
to make requests; using gestures and symbols of subservience 
and dominance; engaging in mutually enjoyable conversation 
about family, crops, politics, and village events; mixing 
pleading and indignant tones; shaming the riti into giving 
more than a meager amount; explicitly asserting one’s 
rightful claim to desired objects; using linguistic minimizers 
to convey openness and vagueness; appealing to values of 
religious merit and duty to those who suffer; and disputing 
riti’s assertions that they are undeserving. 
Cultural time: Auspiciousness and dosh maanay
  Like many consequential actions in Hindu communities, the 
practice of riti maagnay is believed by the people of Bajhang to 
be most fruitful if undertaken during auspicious time, or shubha 
bela, and avoided during inauspicious time, or ashubha or dosh 
bela. By auspicious is meant the appropriate connection of 
time and temporal events in relation to particular categories of 
places, objects, and persons (Madan 1985:12-13).3 Auspicious 
times are determined astrologically, according to the phases 
of the moon, days of the week, and the time of day based on 
planetary alignment. They also may be determined by ritual 
events surrounding life passages such as births and deaths, 
as well as phases of the agricultural cycle. Auspiciousness 
involves space, time, people, and objects which, if connected 
in proper and appropriate ways, bear well-being, happiness, 
health, and balance. Dalits often evaluate the auspiciousness 
of plans to riti magné, connecting their moral right to ask for 
objects with their cultural knowledge of appropriate timing.
  The practice of avoiding inauspicious times to undertake 
action is called dosh manay, to “observe the inauspiciousness” 
of certain times and actions, and to avoid activities during 
those times. The effect of dosh would be to render attempts to 
receive objects fruitless; many Dalits will not approach riti to 
ask for things if they consider the time to be inauspicious to 
either themselves or to their riti. There is not strict conformity 
to dosh mane among all Dalit families and groups. The women 
I know in a Damai family observe dosh based on the riti’s 
situation and not based on their own family situation, while 
others will consider the auspiciousness of both families. 
Finally, the Baadi apply the most complex grid of dosh mane to 
their magné practices. They do not magnu on days in which the 
moon is in an inauspicious phase, for example purnima (full 
moon), aunsi (no moon), sankranti (first day of the month), 
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masanti (last day of month), and ekadashi (eleventh day after 
aunsi). Also, if the riti is inside the house eating they will not 
magné because the patron will not give. If the bar (day) is 
good but the riti is placing a fresh coat of mud-plaster on the 
walls of the house - a practice called lipnay that is associated 
with the auspiciousness of a religious or lunar event - they 
will not magné because the riti will not give on such days, 
either. Other days deemed inauspicious by the Baadi are 
Maagh tihar, utraini and shatraini (inauspicious planetary 
alignments), and sraddha (death anniversary of both the riti 
and the bhagya’s ancestors). 
  The most important times to request one’s khalo share are 
the rice and wheat harvest months of Kartik (mid-October 
through mid-November 15) and Jeth (mid-May through mid-
June 15), especially while the crop is being harvested in the 
field. If the month progresses without the bhagya initiating 
requests, she or he may not receive khalo until months later; 
once the harvest is stored the bhagya must wait until the riti 
themselves have eaten from the new grain stores. Riti maagnay, 
then, is not a series of spontaneous events initiated at will by 
bhagya. Rather, the practice incorporates a rightful claim to 
ask high caste owner cultivators for subsistence needs, and 
they are framed by moral ideas about appropriate action taken 
at auspicious times. 
linguiStiC StrAtegieS
  Dalits who initiate requests for food and non food items 
convey their right and/or their need to receive the desired 
object, while landowners want to at least initially avoid 
giving to Dalits by either ignoring the request, giving as little 
as possible, and/or demanding they receive something (or 
the promise of something) in return. Competing objectives 
therefore engage both parties in a dialogue that co-constructs 
what it means to be a Dalit who seeks and to be a non Dalit 
who gives.
minimizing and Shaming
  A linguistic strategy effectively used by Dalit bhagya in riti 
maagnay is minimizing, a form of conventional indirectness 
that serves to make the request appear modest yet necessary. 
Minimizing some feature of the request – the amount, the 
item, and/or the person himself - facilitates negotiation and 
compromise between the parties, thus giving Dalits a modicum 
of temporary control over the situation. The vagueness of 
minimizers follows norms of interaction that discourage lower 
status persons (Dalits and women, for example) from making 
direct demands on higher status persons. The expectation 
of future reciprocity and the real belief that Dalits have in 
the rightness of their claims, both support the request as a 
demand. Habermas notes this function of language when 
he observes the following: “... when certain social roles 
prescribe that commands be uttered in the form of requests, 
the pragmatic meaning of the utterance (as a command) in 
no way alters the linguistic meaning of the sentence (as a 
request)” (1979: 45). Such linguistic strategies are common in 
asymmetric speech acts. For Dalits, demonstrating linguistic 
agency can counter positions of dominance by persons of so-
called higher caste. Once the request for an object is established 
through this initial contact the exchange proceeds with the 
mutual understanding that the desired object is negotiable. 
Dalit and Brahman-Chhetri alike should then demonstrate a 
willingness to negotiate in a friendly and fair way.
  Agentic Dalit strategy in riti magné is found also in shaming 
the riti. Though a Dalit may minimize her request, she 
anticipates that the donor will provide more than a small 
amount. If that does not happen, Dalits will ridicule or reject 
a small offering and demand more. Numerous times I have 
observed Dalits either reluctantly accept the item-donation, 
complaining that it is insufficient, or the donation is outright 
rejected and the supplicant begins to walk away in disgust. 
One late afternoon in January, 1989, for example, the wife 
of an ironsmith (Luharni) stopped by the house of a Thakuri 
family I was visiting in Bajhang, taking a break from fieldwork 
to discuss their daughter’s education. Luharni politely asked 
her female riti for some salt and spices to cook her family’s 
evening meal. The Thakuri riti gave her a couple of dried 
red peppers but no salt. The ironsmith’s wife refused to 
take the small dried plants that had been set on the ground, 
exclaiming loud enough for others to hear, “How lobhi [selfish] 
you are! This amount is not worth anything for cooking. And 
you don’t have a small amount of salt?” She began to walk 
away as the Thakuri woman told her “Wait, sister, I’ll get a 
bit more for you. You don’t have to be angry.” Such responses 
to a riti who is being less than generous are very effective, for 
people in this cooperative farming community do not want 
to earn reputations of being greedy and selfish. The use of 
shame by accusing the rich Thakuri landowner accusations 
of selfishness was effective in persuading the riti to be more 
generous. 
  Or take the case of Paru Damai, a tailor who came to a 
Brahman family’s house one morning in December, 1994, as 
I finished eating a rice meal as their guest. He needed rice 
for his own meal that morning, as the women in the family 
were either ill (his elderly wife), menstruating and therefore 
ritually impure to cook food (his older daughter-in-law), or in 
a distant field working for another riti (his youngest daughter-
in-law). Paru’s family had sewn and repaired clothing for 
the extended Brahman family for four generations and his 
right to make food requests outside the harvest season was 
indisputable. Still, as the head of a poor family, Paru was 
vulnerable to riti caprice. That morning he asked: “Hajur, may 
I have a handful of chamal [husked rice] for our breakfast this 
morning?” “How much do you need?” the Brahmani replied. 
“Oh, just a small amount” and he gestured with a cupped 
hand to indicate the meager amount. He was eventually given 
a small amount, to which he replied it was not enough, asking 
rhetorically how that could ever feed a family of seven. After 
about an hour of negotiation, Paru left with the equivalent of 
about two pounds (two maana) of husked rice, far more than 
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the small handful he had originally requested.
Chitta bujnay: to be satisfied
  Both parties understand that satisfied desires, chita bhujnay, 
are the goal of riti maagnay. Dalits do not expect to get exactly 
what they came for, but they will not leave until a modicum of 
satisfaction is realized. Landowners, in turn, typically begin 
the negotiation with an immediate refusal of the request, but 
will eventually find it in their interest to capitulate. They are 
persuaded to act meritoriously (or appear to be acting so), 
they value a future work commitment, and they want the 
solicitation to end. 
ConCluSionS: ComprehenSive SoCiAl 
juStiCe 
  The contribution of Dalit artisans and workers to the 
village economy is indisputable. Yet they participate in 
economic formations not always of their own choosing, as 
evident in their attempts to seek economic independence 
by acquiring land on the local market, and their on-going 
material demands from Brahman-Chhetri landowners. The 
above ‘ethnography of the particular’ hoped to convey also a 
sense of Dalit agency in challenging caste discrimination in a 
form distinct from the challenge to caste oppression offered 
by Dalit political activists. The communicative agency of riti 
magné incorporates linguistic schemas and strategies in which 
the merits of an initial request are debated using persuasion 
and influence, shaming and supplication, and where power 
differences between the castes are challenged. To participate 
in riti maagnay is to perpetuate Brahman-Chhetri domination 
in a fundamental way, but also to resist, deny, and render 
ambiguous and contestable such domination by applying 
discursive techniques embodying alternative community 
values of mutual obligation, cooperation, friendliness and 
generosity. Rural Dalit agency brings to the fore and contests 
the forms of discrimination and oppression importantly 
evoked in the debate over the term “Dalit” by political 
activists, a debate that nonetheless fails to acknowledge the 
economic dependency of Dalits on non Dalits and the former’s 
evolved ability to adjust to and live with respect under those 
conditions. 
  I believe it is the nuances of inter caste relationships that 
will bear significantly on the forms social justice in Nepal 
will take. Broad gestures of reform will be ineffective if 
urban legislators fail to consider sources of Dalit power 
and sources of their dependence on Brahman-Chhetri 
landowners. If those legislators do not actively address rural 
economic interdependence (and there is growing concern 
by nepaldalitinfo.com participants that the Constituent 
Assembly representatives may be less activist and more pawns 
of political parties), there may be unintended consequences of 
severing traditional ties in ways that could negatively impact 
rural Dalits, as one close observer on the ground notes.15 
  An example of the consequences of ignoring rural Dalit 
realities in the wake of social reforms in Nepal can be found 
in the case of family property inheritance reform. Until 
recently, Dalit women inherited property in the same way 
as non Dalit women, that is, through males and primarily 
through husbands after marriage. Most Dalit families own 
little to no land, and what women inherit, then, are economic 
relationships associated with riti-bhagya ties, like the right to 
work for landowners in exchange for harvest shares and other 
material goods described above. Under new family property 
inheritance laws, however, women have the right to inherit 
land and other property equal to brothers. Consequently, Dalit 
women’s main source of economic stability – landowners’ 
land on which they labor as a right they inherit through their 
husband’s family – is potentially destabilized as land becomes 
divided among daughters and sons equally. As the problem of 
landowning daughters’ property inheritance after marriage 
(when daughters typically move away from the natal home) 
has been widely discussed as a potential barrier to women 
claiming their new property rights, problems associated with 
Dalit women’s inheritance (such as the unlikelihood she 
could inherit rights to work from her father’s riti, or that the 
land of her husband’s riti might be reduced by landowner 
daughters’ inheritance) have been ignored, most likely due to 
a lack of understanding by legislators and party leaders about 
rural Dalit women’s situation. 
  The social dimensions of rural economic exchange like 
riti maagnay must be considered as the people and the 
government of Nepal move forward with eliminating caste-
based inequality. My argument here has been that such 
complexities remain unintentionally unacknowledged in 
the quest for an emergent Dalit identity that tends to focus 
on historical trajectories of injustice and abstract ideas of 
political representation, and less on local economic realities 
and community values. An important question that flows 
from recognition of rural agricultural realities in mixed caste 
communities would be how best to replace the in-kind and 
moral economy in artisan and farming relations with forms 
of fair payment to artisans. As we have seen, negotiation is 
a central theme in riti maagnay, suggesting that Dalits feel 
they are not fairly compensated, and that they therefore 
must measure compensation beyond a simple employment 
calculation. It is difficult to verify if, indeed, there is an equal 
exchange of pay for work. Furthermore, the moral dimension 
of exchange – that those with more should give to those 
with less – suggests that the communities involved regard 
entitlement claims as valid. Will the government of Nepal 
be able to replace the agency informed by moral judgment 
and community standards with legalistic fair employment 
practices that can be enforced? Will Dalits be provided 
sufficient incentives to opt out of the inherited system and to 
participate in a free market labor economy, risking the loss 
of a safety net during times of dukkha? Could Dalits become 
landowners and subsistence farmers, in numbers equivalent 
to their non Dalit counterparts? Land reform has not always 
helped Dalits, due to corruption and fraud by non Dalits 
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and due to Dalit unwillingness to settle on land far from the 
reliable, though potentially exploitative, riti bhagya system. 
Can the government of Nepal provide to Dalits an economic 
safety-net now provided by landowners? Such questions 
must be considered in achieving economic justice for Dalit 
families.
  Finally, the question of social justice remains. The efficacy 
of a modern political identity, while partially realized in 
the work of donor agencies and abstract Constitutional 
representation, belies the criminal justice system’s abysmal 
record of protecting Dalits from caste-based crimes. It is widely 
recognized, and a source of continuous frustration for those 
working on behalf of Dalits, that the laws against caste-based 
discrimination are not enforced. Weekly reports of abuse and 
violence against Dalits are inevitably accompanied by reports 
of a weak police investigation, or of no investigation at all. 
Indeed, the staff at FEDO (Feminist Dalit Organization) and 
other Dalit NGOs spend enormous time and effort publicly 
protesting noncompliance to Nepal’s laws, and resorting 
to legal action themselves. Responding to this need, many 
Dalit development projects involve educational programs 
specifically geared toward informing Dalits of their civil and 
legal rights. 
  What we should conclude is that as Nepal progresses from a 
period of violence to a state of hard-fought political equality, 
only a comprehensive approach toward social justice involving 
economic, civil, and educational rights will be acceptable to 
Dalit communities. 
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ENDNOTES
1. A scene composed from field observations in Bajhang recorded 
during the years 1978-2001.
2. The figures for Nepal’s Dalit population vary widely and are a 
source of controversy. The government itself uses different figures 
in the same year from its own census reports, depending on the con-
text, and they are widely regarded as too low. Dalit NGO Federation 
conducted its own census in 2003 and found the population to be 
around 23%. I thank D.B. Bishwakarma for this information (email 
communication March 5, 2008).
3. I would like to credit this last point to discussions with Dr. 
Drona Rasali.
4. In Bajhang the practice relates to what is locally called riti 
bhagya or rithi bhage (depending on local dialects), translated as the 
“tradition of receiving harvest shares,” a term that over time has 
also come to refer to the people involved, such that rithi refers to 
landowners who are usually of elite caste and others (ethnic minori-
ties and other dalits, for example) for whom Dalit artisans, referred 
to as bhagya, work. As described later, these are inherited economic 
relationships. Riti bhagya or rithi bhage is a term used primarily in 
Seti and Mahakali Zones. In other regions of Nepal the relationship 
goes by different names such as balighare pratha. In this article I re-
tain the term riti bhagya commonly used in Bajhang when referring 
to both the custom of economic interdependence and to the people 
themselves.
5. See Hangen 2005 on the political identity of ethnic minority 
groups in Nepal.
6. I thank Mr. Motilal Nepali, Chair of Dalit NGO Federation 
- Nepal and Dalit Welfare Association, and Mr. DB Sagar Bishwakar-
ma, President, International Commission for Dalit Rights (ICDR), 
for assisting me with information on Dalit NGOs in Nepal.
7. The most famous Nepali to use the surname Bishwokarma was 
former Minister Hira Lal Bishwokarma. Before him, though, many 
Nepali Dalits had registered their surnames as Bishwokarma (and 
other versions) (email correspondence Om Prakash VK, 7-28-07).
8. The enormously important contribution that Dalit artisans 
make to the local economy can be seen in Table 4 of Cameron (1998, 
pp. 33-34), that lists the functional and aesthetic products produced 
by Bajhangi Dalit artisans.
9. Evidence from Palpa District in western Nepal suggests that 
this ethos may be absent and that Dalits routinely feel exploited 
by landholding families for whom they work and from whom they 
receive less than adequate payment (email correspondence, DB 
Bishwakarma, 7-8-2007).
10. Relations of domination between non Dalits over Dalits are 
the focus of early studies on South Asian culture, including Berre-
man 1979, Borgstrom 1980, Briggs 1975, Freeman 1979, Galanter 
1972, Hofer 1979, Khare 1984, Lynch 1969, Mencher 1974, and 
Miller 1966, 1969. 
11. The concept of dharma, defined as religion and religious or 
meritorious duty based on one’s relative social position, is central 
to Hindu ideology and popular Hindu culture (Allen 1982; Daniel 
1984; Fruzzetti 1982; Khare 1976; Inden and Nicholas 1977; Ko-
lenda 1982; Madan 1982).
12. Due to the scarcity of grain among Dalit families, their pay-
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ments to other Dalit riti are in the form of exchanges of services or 
commodities, rather than grains.
13. Lohar ironsmiths (Kami) receive the largest khalo per family 
because their tool-making work is vital to the agricultural economy 
and is considered physically demanding. Sarki, Parki, and Oudh 
receive smaller khalo and have fewer riti families. The value of the 
Sarki’s leatherworking has greatly diminished in the past few de-
cades because of local preferences for imported plastic goods such as 
sandals from other parts of Nepal or India. Parki and Oudh receive 
smaller khalo shares because the Parki’s bamboo products and the 
Oudh’s masonry skills are not in regular demand. In my research I 
found that the greatest total amount of khalo was given to the Badi 
because all Brahman-Chhetri families feel obliged to give to them. 
The Badi do no farming for themselves or for anyone else and are 
completely dependent on the generosity of the Brahman-Chhetri.
14. Of the different artisan groups in Bajhang, the Badi most 
broadly interpret their riti duty to them, and constantly request 
grains, lentils, spices, salt, money, cigarettes, and even alcohol, in 
exchange for what many perceive to be minimal services rendered 
as entertainers and potters.
15. Peter Burleigh (former Ambassador and Deputy Representa-
tive to the United Nations, Ambassador to Sri Lanka and the Re-
public of Maldives, official in the U.S. embassies in Nepal, Bahrain, 
India, and Sri Lanka, and former Peace Corps volunteer in Nepal) 
recently informed me of this possible development, in his current 
role as Nepal election observer for the Carter Center (email com-
munication March 4, 2008).
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Blacksmith family from Syara, 
Humla district, Nepal
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